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AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

StPrene Court of Minnesota.
IIERRICK v. MINNEAPOLIS AND ST. L. RAILWAY CO.
A cause of action i hich accrued in one state, under a statute of that state
making every corporation operating a railroad in that state liable for all damages
sustained by its employees in consequence of the negligence of other employees of
such corporation when such wrongs are in uny manner connected with the use or
operation of any railway on or about which they shall be employed, may be maintained and enforced in another state, although there is in the latter state no similar
statute, the common-law rule upon the subject prevailing.
The fact that such statute only applies to corporations operating railroads does
not render it in conflict with the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution, that "1no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

APPEAL

from an order of the District Court, Freeborn county.

-Lovely and Horgan, for appellant.
J. -D. Springer, for respondent.
MITCIHELL, J.-The defendant owned and operated a line of
railroad from Albert Lea, in this state, to Fort Dodge, in the state
of Iowa. The plaintiff entered the service of defendant, in Iowa,
as brakeman on one of its trains, to be operated wholly in that
state. While coupling cars on his train, in the discharge of his
duty in that state, plaintiff was injured through the negligence of the engineer in charge of the train, under such circumstances as to give him a right of action under a statute of Iowa,
which makes every corporation operating a railway in that state
liable for all damages sustained by any person, including employees
of such corporation, in consequence of the neglect of agents, or
by mismanagement of the engineers or other employees of such
corporation, when such wrongs are in any manner connected with
the use or operation of any railway on or about which they shall
be employed: Section 1307, tit. 10, c. 5, Code of Iowa 1870.
This action was brought to recover damages for the personal injury
thus sustained in that state. The court below dismissed the action
on the ground that the right of action thus accruing under the
statute of Iowa could only be enforced in that state. The correctness of this ruling is the only question involved in this appeal.
The general rule is that actions for personal torts are transitory
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in their nature, and may be brought wherever the wrongdoers may
be found and jurisdiction of his person can be obtained. As to
torts which give a right of action at common law, this rule has
never been questioned, and we do not see why the transitory character of the action, or the jurisdiction of the courts of another
state to entertain it, can in any manner be affected by the question
whether the right of action is statutory or common law. In actions ez contractu there is no such distinction, and there is no good
reason why any different rule should be applied in actions ex delicto, whenever, by either common law or statute, a right of action
has become fixed and legal liability incurred. That liability, if
the action be transitory, may be enforced, and the right of action
pursued, in the courts of any state which can obtain jurisdiction
of the defendant, provided it is not against the public policy of
the laws of the state where it is sought to be enforced. Of course,
statutes that are criminal or penal in their nature will only be
enforced in the state which enacted them; but the statute under
which this action is brought is neither, being purely one for the
reparation of a civil injury.
The statute of another state, has, of course, no extra-territorial
force, but rights acquired unjer it will always, in comity, be enforced, if not against the public policy of the laws of the former.
In such cases the law of the place where the right was acquired,
or the liability was incurred, will govern as to the right of action ;
while all that pertains merely to the remedy will be controlled by
the law of the state where the action is brought. And we think
the principle is the same whether the right of action be ex contractw or ex delicto. The defendant admits the general rule to be
as thus stated, but contends that as to the statutory actions like
the present it is subject to the qualification that to sustain the action the law of the forum and the law of the place where the right
of action accrued must concur in holding that the act done gives a
right of action. We admit that some text writers-notably, Rorer,
Inter-state Law-seem to lay down this rule, but the authorities
cited generally fail to sustain it. We have examined all the numerous cases cited on this point by defendant, and we find only one
which in our opinion sustains him, while several are really against
him. Most of the-cases thus cited belong to one or the other of
the two following classes : First, cases which hold that statutes
giving a right of action for injuries causing the death of another
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having no extra-territorial operation, only apply to injuries intlicted
in the state which enacted the statute, and not to injuries inflicted
or acts done in another state. Such is the case of Whitford -i.
Railroad Co., 23 N. Y. 465. This undoubtedly is the settled law,
but it does not touch the present case. The second class consists
of cases which hold that where the statute gives such right of action to the personal representatives of the deceased, it can only be
maintained by an administrator or executor appointed and acting
under the laws of the state which enacted the statute, taking the
ground that this right of action is not a right of property which
passes to the estate, but is for the benefit of the family or next of
kin of the deceased, and therefore the, statute contemplates the
exercise of the power and the execution of the trust only by a personal representative appointed under domestic laws. To this class
belong the cases of Richardson v. Railroad Co., 98 Mass. 85, and
Woodward v. Railroad Co., 10 Ohio St. 121. Some courts refuse
to adopt this rule. But this question is not involved in the present case.
A few cases appear to lay some stress upon the fact that the
statutes of both states were similar, but rather as evidence of the
fact that the statute of the state giving the right of action is not
contrary to the policy of the laws of the state where the action is
brought. Such is the case of C., St. L. &' N. 0. Railroad Co.
v. Doyle, (Sup. Ct. Miss.) 8 Amer. & Eng. Ry. Cas. 171, in which
after saying that the action may be asserted because of the coincidence of the statutes of the two states, the court adds: "And,
independently of this, because a right of action created by the
statute of another state, of a transitory nature, may be enforced
here when it does not conflict with the public policy of this state
to permit its enforcement ; and our statute is evidence that the
public policy of this state is favorable to such rights, instead of
being inimical to them." But it by no means follows because
the statute of one state differs from the law of another state, that
therefore it would be held contrary to the policy of the laws of the
latter state. Every day our courts are enforcing rights under foreign contracts where the lex loci contractus and the lex fori are
altogether different, and yet we construe these contracts and enforce rights under them according to their force and effect under
the laws of the state where made. To justify a court in refusing
to enforce a right of action which accrued under the law of another
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state, because against the policy of our laws, it must appear that
it is against good' morals or natural justice, or that for some other
such reason the enforcement of it would be prejudicial to the general interests of our own citizens. If the state of Iowa sees fit to
impose this liability upon those operating railroads within her
bounds, and to make it a condition of the employment of those
who enter their service, we see nothing in such a law repugnant
either to good morals or natural justice, or prejudicial to the
interests of our own citizens.
The only case which goes to the length of holding that this action
St. P.
can not be maintained, is that of Anderson v. ff.
Railroad Co., 37 Wis. 321, which, on the facts, is on all-fours
with the present case, and in which the court holds that such an
action will only lie in the state of Iowa, which enacted the statute.
But with due deference to that court, and especially to the eminent
jurist who delivered the opinion in that case, we think they
entirely failed to distinguish between the right of action, which
was created by the statute of Iowa and must be governed by it,
and the form of the remedy, which is always governed by the law
of the forum, whether the action be ex contractu or ex delicto. It
is elementary that the remedy'is governed by the law of the forum,
and this is all that is held by any case cited by the court in support of their opinion.
The case of Bettys v. Milwaukee & St. P. Railroad Co., 37 Wis.
323, was an action brought under an Iowa statute to recover douhle
damages for cattle killed in Iowa. This case was probably correctly decided upon the second ground stated in the opinion, viz.,
that the statute was penal, and therefore could only be enforced
in the state which enacted it
The following cases, we think, support our conclusion that this
action may be maintained, although we have no such statute in
this state: Dennicek v. Railroad .Co., 103 U. S. 11 ; Leonard v.
Steam Nav. Co., 84 N. Y. 48; Chicago, St. L. &' N. 0. Railroad
Co. v. Doyle, supra ; N. 4- C. B. Co. v. Sprayberry, 8 Baxt.
(Tenn.) 341. See also, Selma, Rome & Dalton Railroad Co. v.
Lacy, 43 Ga. 461, and s. c. 49 Ga. 10.
The defendant further contends that the statute of Iowa is in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, which declares that "no state shall deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
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The ground for this contention consists in the fact that the law
does not apply to all persons, but only to railroad companies, thus
imposing on them a liability not imposed on others. There is
great danger that some of the provisions of this fourteenth amendment will be attempted to be applied to cases for which it was
never designed. In view of the history surrounding its adoption,
we doubt whether it was ever intended to apply to cases like the
present. But, even if it was, we find nothing in this statute repugnant to its provisions. The provision of the constitutional
amendment referred to does not surround the citizen with any protection additional to those before given under the constitutions of
the states. It was not in the power of .the states, before the adoption of this amendment, to deprive citizens of the United States of
equal protection of tie laws; the only change produced by making
this constitutional principle a part of the federal constitution is to
make the Supreme Court of the United States the final arbiter of
cases in which a violation of this principle by state law is complained of. If a state, in view of the peculiar nature of the service upon railroads, and the danger incident to it, shall, as a matter of state policy, require these corporations, which are the creatures of its statutes, to assume the risk of injuries to their servant,
resulting from the negligence of fellow-servants also in their employ, we think they have a right to do so. Statutes imposing special duties and liabilities upon railroad companies are to be found
on the statute-books of almost every state, and if general in their
application to all such corporations they are valid: AfcAunich v.
By. Co., 20 Iowa 338 John8on v. UMicago, . J"St. P. By. Co.,
13 N. W. Rep. 673.
Order reversed.
The principal case is one of great
interest, both on account of the important
principle involved, and because, on first
perusal, it seems opposed to the weight
of authority upon the subject. While,
however, it may seem and perhaps is
thus opposed to the mere weight of common-law authority, it is believed that
upon principle-which ought to prevail
when the question is a new one, as this
was in the State of Minnesota-the
decision is entirely philosophical and
correct.

Without inquiring into the foundation
of the so-called doctrine of comity,
whether it exists ex comitate or ex debito
justitim, as to which different opinions
may perhaps still exist, we find a substantial agreement among the authorities
as to the general statement of the extent
of its application, at least so far as Telates to contracts and common-law transitory torts. As stated in the principal
case, we cannot see how the case can be
in any manner affected by the question
whether the right of action is statutory
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or common law. The distinction between
statutory and coinmorj-law rights made
by some of the authorities has little to
commend it. See Mr. Bigelow's note to
sect. 625 of the eighth edition of Story's
Conflict of Laws, and the cases there
cited.
Air. Story in his valuable work upon the
Conflict of Laws, sec. 38: (theitalics are
our own), says: "There is then not only
no impropriety in the use of the phrase
' comity of nations,' but it is the most appropriate phrase to express the true
foundation and extent of the obligation
of the laws of one nation within the territories of another. It is derived altogether
from the voluntary consent of the latter,
and is inadmissiblewhen it is contraryto its
known policy or prejudicial to its interests.
In the silence of any positive rule affirming or denying or restraining the operation of foreign laws, courts of justice
presume tacit adoption of them by their
own government, unless they are repugnant to its policy or prejudicial to its
interests."
With reference to this same subject,
Dr. L. Bar, of G~ttingen, says:
"Obligations arising from delicts, and
from circumstances of a kindred nature,
furnish a general exception to the universal application of the lex domicilil
to the import of obligations, The obligation arising from a delict may have
as its subject, 1st, reparation for the
damage done, and 2d, a penalty to be
paid to the injureil person.
"As far as regards these obligations
under the first head, the rules of law in
reference to them contain no more than
such instructions as every one who lives
in the state where they are in force must
observe in his dealings with other persons and things that happen to be there.
It is obvious that by failing in this
responsibility, the foreigner becomes
subject to these laws; and as everystate requires this submission of the
citizen of other states in its territory, it
must always recognise the same submis-
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sion of its own subjects to a foreign
state. The law of the place where the
prejudicial act was done, or the prejudicial circamstances happened, decides
the obligation to make reparation.
* * * The law of the place of action
must also be kept in view to this effect,
that the judge can never recognise a claim
which the ideas of his own law pronounce
to be immoral or indecent:" Bar's Int.
Law (Soule & Bugbee's ed.), sect. 66,
p. 272, 273. The italics in the last
paragraph are our own.
According to these authorities a civil
cause of action, accruing in a foreign
country, will be enforced in the courts of
the forum, except where it is contrary
to the knownqpolicy of the countrywhere
the action is brought or prejudicial to its
interests. As respects contracts, it is
believed that the above principle will be
accepted as correct in every common-law
court.
As respects torts, however, we find in
the English reports and text books a
qualification added, thus :
Mr. Foote says: "The action complained of must have been a legal wrong,
both by the law of the place where it was
done and by the law of England, where
the action for damages is brought:"
Foote's .Priv. Int. Law, Pt. III., ch.
ix., p. 393. See, also, p. 390 et seq.
Mr. Westlake says: "The lex fori
and lex loci
delicti commissi must concur in
order that an act or an omission may be
deemed tortious: Westlake's Priv. Int
Law, ed. of 1880, ch. xi., p. 221.
"Neither can any act be treated as a
wrong in England which is not such in
the defendant by the principles of English law, notwithstanding that the
defendant is liable by the laws of the
country where the act was done. But
'the English court admits the proof of
the foreign law * * * as one of the
facts upon which the existence of the
tort or the right to damages may depend ; * * * and it then applies and
enforces its own laws so far as it is
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applicable to the case thus established :' "
Westlake's Priv. Int.Law, ed. of 1880,
sect. 187, citing The Halley, L. R., 2
P. C. 193.
"But the last section (187) must be
understood without prejudice to this, that
an act may be treated as a wrong in England which is not such in the defendant
by the English law otherwise than as
adopting some rule of public international law :"Id., sec. 188, citing The
Nostra Signora de los Dolores 1813,
Dodson 290, in which Scott, a part
owner of a privateer, was held liable for
her acts, although by the English law in
the narrower sense, as between British
subjects, he would not have been so
liable, because his name 4id not appear
in her register. In this case the court
said that the English statute was passed
for reasons of domestic policy, and that
all its regulations were of a domestic
description, but considered that it had
no force as against foreigners.
In The M. Moxlarm, L. R., I P. D.
107, 111, the law respecting personal
injuries and respecting wrongs to personal property, is stated by MELLsn, L.

J., to be perfectly settled, that no action
can be maintained in the courts of England on account of a wrongful act
either to a person or to personal property, committed within the jurisdiction
of a foreign country, unless the act is
wrongful by the law of the country
where it is committed, and also wrongful
by the law of England. The cases of
The Halley, L. R., 2 P. C. 193, and
Phillips v. Eyre, L. R., 6 Q. B. 1, are
cited by this learned judge as conclusive upon the question. The case
of The Halley, especially, is directly
in point. That case was the case
of a collision with a ship in foreign
waters. By the law of the foreign
country the ship was liable, and the
owners were liable as owners of the
ship; but by the law of England
the ship and owners were not liable,
because there was a pilot on board who

was taken on board compulsorily, and
who was navigating the ship, and the
negligent act was his act. Upon this it
was held, that notwithstanding the ship
and the owners were liable according to
the law of the country where the act was
committed, yet inasmuch as they were
not liable by the law of England, no
action could be maintained against
them.
Leaving the English authorities and
referring to some American writers, we
find Mr. Wharton laying down the rule
as follows:
"T~Ae prevalent rule is, that to-sustain an action for a tort committed
abroad, the lexfori and the lex led delicti
must concur in holding that the act complained of is the subject of legal redress:" Wharton's Conflict of Laws,
sect. 478. To sustain this proposition
he cites Westlake Int. Law, sect. 186;
Foote Int. Law 394, and the cases cited
by the former author, together with a
number of American cases, of which, so
far as we can discover, only the case of
Nashville Railroad v. Eakin, 6 Cold.
582, supports the doctrine of the text as
broadly as it is stated.
Judge Coormy, in his work on Torts
(p. 472), says:
"Where a new right of action is
given by the statute for that for which
no action would lie at the common law,
such action can only be brought within
the state or country whose statute gives
the right, and for wrongs there suffered.
This has often been decided under those
statutes which give an action for causing
death by wrongful act, neglect or default."
To maintain this proposition
the learned author cites Whitfordv.Panama Railroad Co., 23 N. Y. 465 ; Richardson v. N. Y. Cent. Railroad Co., 98
Mass. 85, and Woodward v. Mich., 4-c.,
Railroad Co., 10 Ohio St. 121 (all referred to in the principal case); and State
v. P'ttsburqh, 6-c., Railroad Co., 45 Md.
41, and Needham v. G. T. Railroad Co.,
38 Vt. 294, in both of which cases
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actions were brought upon the statutes
of the forum for injuries happening in

an injury to the person for which the

common law gives a remedy by action,
another state. In the former case it did rests upon the presumption that the comnot appear what, if any legislation,
mon law prevails in the state where the
existed upon the subject in the other injury was committed, and that the instate, and therefore the common law was jured party could have recovered there
presumed to exist; and in the latter had the action been brought in such
case the common law was assumed to state ; and that the remedy in such cases
exist in the state where the injury hap- is given by the courts of one country or
pened, by which no right of action was state upon the principle of comity, which
given.
is due by one sovereign state or country
It will be observed that the cases last to another under similar circumstances ;
above cited all belong to the first and proceeds to apply the same rule of
second classes referred to in the principal comity to the case of similar statutes,
case; and with the exception, perhaps, stating that "in fact where there are
of the case of Nashville Railroad v. similar statutes instead of the common
Eakin, 6 Cold. 582, no American case law, the right to recover damages stands
has been found that holds in accordance precisely the same as if the common law
with the English rule that in all cases the in both states relating to the subject prelexjoriand the lex loci delictimust concur vailed." The case does not support thedoctrine that the action would lie where
in holding that the act complained of
can be the subject of legal redress. Of the common law prevailed in only one of
course all the authorities concur in hold- the states.
ing that where the act is not wrongful
In Selma, 6,c., Railroad Co. v. Lacy,
by the law of the place where committed, 43 Ga. 461, the court appear to have
it cannot be made unlawful by the statute decided the case upon the same princiof another state where the action is ple as that stated in the case last cited.
brought. Nearly all the cases cited by In concluding his opinion, WA.nNE-,
J.,
the American authors above quoted are said : "Inasmuch, therefore, as it does
cases of this description, and do not not affirmatively appear from the plainsupport the converse proposition that no tiff's declaration that in the state of
action will lie where the act is action- Alabama, where the injury is alleged to
able by the law of the place where com- have been done, the laws of that state
mitted, but not actionable by the law of are similar to our own in respect to the
injury for which redi'ess is sought here
the forum.
Referring now to the cases cited by under the provisions of our statute, or
the court as sustaining the decision in the that the common law is not of force in
principal case: in Leonard v. Columbia that state in respect to the injury comSteam Nao. Co., 84 N. Y. 48, the action plained of, the court below erred in
was brought in New York to recover overruling the demurrer to the plaindamages for an injury done in Con- tiff's declaration." When the case subnecticut, and it appeared from the sequently, came again before the court
report of the case that the statutes of
(49 Geo. 106), it was held that the
the two states upon this subject were court would be governed by the laws of
substantially the same. In discussing its own state as to the mode of prothe question, the court, per MILLER, J.,
cedure in ascertaining the rights of the
after stating the rule that at common parties, but that what are their rights
law personal actions, whether ex con- must be determined by the laws of Alatractu or ex delicto, are transitory; that bama, where the act complained of was
the right to recover in another state for done. In this case no right existing in
VOL. XXXIL-5
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Alabama, there was none to be enforced case; and, while not authoritative upon
in Georgia. While the rule of comity the question involved in the principal
was assumed to be the basis of a decision case, does, by way of argument, support
enforcing the statute of another state, the conclusion arrived at in the principal
"not being contrary to the policy or case.
In the case of N. 4- C. Railroad Co.
prejudicial to the interests of this state,"
inasmuch as no cause of action appeared v. Sprayberry, 8 Baxt. 341, the propoto exist in Alabama, the decision in sition contended for in the principal case
question is negative in character, and 'is stated baldly, without argument or
not a direct authority in favor of the citation of authority, which deprives it
of much of the weight it would otherprincipal case.
In Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S. wise possess.
In this unsatisfactory state of the com11, 17, Mr. Justice MsILER thus states
the question before the court for decis- mon-law authorities upon this question,
ion : "It is understood that the decision we think the court decided wisely in
of the court below rested solely upon the placing its decision upon the principle
proposition. that the liability in a civil so well stated by Judge SToRy and Dr.
action for damages, which, under the BAR in the passages above quoted.
statute of New Jersey, is imposed upon Although the English authorities holda party by whose wrongful act, neglect ing that the act must be a legal wrong,
or default death ensues, can be enforced both by the law of the place where the
by no one but an administrator, or other act was done and where the action is
personal representative of the deceased, brought, appear to havo settled the
appointed by !he authority of the state. question in England, the rule contended
for in the principal case seems much
And the soundness or unsoundness of
this proposition is what we are called more in accordance with the analogies
upon to decide." And it was held that of the law in other respects, and much
the suit could be maintained by the per- more rational. In conclusion it would
sonal representative of the deceased ap- seem that upon principle the only limipointed under the laws of New York. tations upon the liability of the defend
The argument of the court goes to the ant, in a case like the principal case, in
extent claimed in the principal case, but a state other than that where the act
inasmuch as the statutes of New York was committed, should be that the liaand New Jersey appear to be.based upon bility sought to be enforced shall not be
the same principle; the case is not an contrary to the policy of the state where
authority upon the precise question in- the action is brought, or prejudicial to
its interests.
volved in the principal case.
MARSHALL D. EWELL.
The case of Chicago, St. L., 4-c.,
Chicago.
Railroad Co. v. Doyle, is sufficiently
stated in the opinion in the principal
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Circuit Court, -Eastern-Districtof Arkansas.
CREDIT COMPANY (LiMITED) or LONDON, ENGLAND, v. ARKANSAS CENT. RAILROAD CO., AND OTHERS.
A court of equity may authorize the receiver of a railroad to issue certificates of
indebtedness and make them a first lien upon the road, for the purpose of raising
funds to make necessary repairs and improvements, but it is a power to be sparingly
exercised ; and when the road cannot be kept running without its exercise, except
to a very limited extent, the sound policy is to discharge the receiver, or stop running the road and speed the foreclosure.
In the absence of fraud the beneficiaries in railway mortgages are bound by what
is done by their trustees.
Where a holder of railroad bonds alleged the trustee had filed a bill and obtained
a decree of foreclosure for the principal of the bonds not due, as well as for the interest which was due, without the written request of the holders of one-third in
amount of the bonds, which it was claimed was a necessary prerequisite by the terms
of the mortgage to the exercise of the power to declare the principal debt. due, and
sought for this reason to avoid the foreclosure proceedings, held, (1) that it was
competent for the trustee to file a bill to foreclose for the interest due: (2) that the
plaintiff ratified the action of its trustee by filing and proving in the master's office,
in the foreclosure proceedings, more than one-third in amount of all the bonds issued ;
and (3) that the absence of such a requisition did not affect the jurisdiction of the
court, and a decree for a larger sum than was due was error merely, to be corrected
on appeal, and that as the error was one of which the trustees could not complain,
and there was no fraud, the bondholders wer as much bound as the trustee, and
could not avoid the decree, on this ground, iu,
any form of proceeding.
When the property of a railroad company is sold under a decree of foreclosure,
at which all persons are authorized to bid, the fact that it is purchased by the president of the company in his individual right will not in itself raise a trust relation
between him and a holder of the bonds of the company, which will entitle the latter
to treat him as a trustee of the property so purchased.
One claiming the right to avoid a purchase made by another at a judicial sale, or
of treating the purchaser as a trustee, and availing himself of the purchaser's bid,
cannot delay the assertion of this right to enable him to decide in the light of subsequent events whether he would or not be profited by its assertion.

Ix Equity.

N. & J. Erb, for plaintiffs.
U. M. and C. B. Bose, and C. C. Waters, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CALDWELL, J.-The Arkansas Central Railroad Company was

formed for the purpose of constructing a railroad from Helena to
Little Rock, with a branch to Pine Bluff. The chief ultimate promoters of this enterprise were Stephen W. Dorsey and J. E.
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Gregg. Dorsey was the president of the company, and its financial
agent and manager, and generally controlled and conducted all the
affairs of the corporation.
What is commonly called an exhaustive contract was entered
into between the company and J. E. Gregg & Co. for the construction of the road, by the terms of which Gregg & Co. were to
build the road for all its stock subscriptions and other assets, and a
majority of its stock.
The directors of the railroad company and all its officers, except
the president, seem never to have had more than a mere nominal
existence after the making of this contract, From that time Gregg
& Co. were regarded as owners of the road, and its assets in hand,
as well as all that might thereafter-be acquired.
Dorsey was a member of this firm also, and in the double capacity of president of the railroad company, and a member of the
firm of Gregg & Co., he seems to have managed the financial affairs
of both.
The company executed a mortgage to secure its first mortgage
bonds, which were put upon the market and sold to the amount of
$720;000. The defendant, the Union Trust Company of. New
York, was the trustee in this mortgage. Dorsey went abroad to
effect a sale of the bonds, and succeeded in placing most of them in
London and Amsterdam.
By the fall of 1872, forty-eight miles of the road, which was a
narrow gauge, had been completed in an imperfect manner. The
work of construction was never resumed after that date. About
this time Dorsey engaged actively in politics, and having been
elected to the United States senate in the early part of 1873, and
the assets and resources of the railroad company'having been exhausted, he and the firm of J. E. Gregg & Co. soon ceased to take
any further interest in the enterprise; and the defendant Johnson,
who had at the solicitation of Dorsey invested some money in the
concern of J. E. Gregg & Co., was elected president, and had the
control and management of the road, and the affairs of the company
from that time until the commencement of proceedings to foreclose.
The company had neither resources nor credit, and the earnings of
the road were barely sufficient to keep it running, without making
needed repairs and improvements. The construction of the fortyeight miles of road seems to have absorbed the proceeds of the
$720,000 first-mortgage bonds of the company, and of state
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aid and state levee bonds, and county and municipal subscriptions, amounting in the aggregate to some $2,000,000. The
company was hopelessly insolvent. No interest was paid on its
first-mortgage bonds, and on the 20th day of September 1876, the
trustee filed a bill in the United States District Court at Helena,
then in the western district, to foreclose the mortgage. The bill
alleged that the holders of one-third in amount of the bonds had
requested the trustee to foreclose. A receiver was appointed, upon
whose application Judge PARKER authorized the issue of receiver's
certificates to the amount of $75,000, to make necessary repairs and
improvements on the road. Between the date of this order and
the next term of the court, Helena was transferred to this district,
and the judge of this district rescinded the order authorizing the
receiver to issue certificates. The rescinding order was not made
because the road did not stand in need of repairs. It was notoriously true that its condition was such as to make it dangerous to
life and property to run cars over it; ties were rotten, iron worn
out, rolling stock in bad condition, bridges insecure, culverts
washed out, and the road-bed in many places too low, resulting in
over-flows of the track and stoppage of trains. No repairs nor
betterments had been put upbn the road since it had been built.
It seems to be settled that a court of equity has the power in this
class of cases to authorize its receiver to issue certificates of indebtedness, and make them a first lien upon the road, for the purpose
of raising funds to make necessary repairs and improvements:
Wallace v. Loomis, 97 U. S. 146, 162; s. c. 2 Woods 506, under
title, Stanton v. Alabama & C. Railroad Co.
But it is a power to be sparingly exercised. It is liable to great
abuse, and while it is usually resorted to under the pretext that it
will enhance the security of the bondholders, it not unfrequently
results in taking from them the security they already have, and
appropriating it to pay debts contracted by the court. The history
of Wallace v. Loomis, supra, furnishes an instructive lesson on
this subject.
This court has uniformly refused to arm its receivers with such
a dangerous power. When the road cannot be kept running without its exercise, except to a very limited extent, the safe and sound
practice is to discharge the receiver or stop running the road, and
speed the foreclosure.
In the case of Paine v. -Little Rock lp Ft. S.Bailroad o,
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April term, 1874, application was made to this court to authorize a
receiver to issue certificates, which were to be a first lien, to build
sixty miles of road, in order to earn a large and valuable land
grant, which would lapse in a short time unless the road was completed. A majority in value of the first-mortgage bondholders, concurred in the application : and the orders of the court in the case
of Stanton v. Alabama & C. Railroad Co., 2 Woods 506 (the case
was not thent reported), and the case of Xennedy v. St. Paul &
Pac. Railroad Co., 2 Dill. 448, were pressed upon the attention
of the court. But the order was refused upon the ground that it
was no part of the duty of a court of chancery to build railroads,
and that the assent of all the parties interested in the property could
not make it such. And there is no difference, so far as relates to
this question, between building a railroad and making extensive and
general repairs and betterments, the cost of which sometimes approximates the cost of original construction. In the case referred
to, of the Fort Smith railroad, the proceedings to foreclose were
speeded, and a decree rendered to meet the exigencies of the case,
which the Supreme Court approved, and said "was a much more
desirable plan" than to issue receiver's certificates: Shaw v.
Railroad Co., 100 U. S. 612.
Before the order authorizing the receiver to incur debts for repairs and other purposes was rescinded, he had incurred debts to
the amount of some $22,000, chiefly for ties and a machine-shop.
The ties were indispensable if trains were to be kept running, and
the machine-shop was a necessary and valuable property to the road,
and its use a necessity, though that could probably have been had
without purchasing the property. A final decree of foreclosure
was rendered on the 17th day of March 1877.- By the terms of
the decree the purchaser was required to pay $40,000 in cash.
This sum was required to pay the receiver's certificates, and other
costs and expenses of foreclosure. Any amount bid in excess of
the $40,000 could he paid in first-mortgage bonds. Unusual pains
were taken to convey to the bondholders actual notice of the foreclosure proceedings, and holders of $661,000, out of a total of
$720,000 of the first-mortgage bonds had actual notice of the foreclosure proceedings, and the time and place of sale. The present
plaintiffs had opened negotiations looking to a foreclosure of the
mortgage before the bill for that purpose was filed by the trustee;
and before the sale under the decree it filed and proved in the
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master's office bonds to the amount of $461,000, being the very bonds
on which this suit is bottomed. The road was sold at the master's
sale for $40,000 to S. H. Horner, as trustee for A. H. Johnson,
the then president of the railroad company, and superintendent of
the road under the receiver.
The plaintiff, by its agent, had notice of this sale, and appeared,
by its attorney, in court and moved to open the biddings for the
road, and the court passed an order that the biddings would be
opened if the present plaintiff or any person should advance the
bid $5000 during a period of ten days allowed for that purpose.
The plaintiff, or its agent, declined to open the biddings. In the
meantime Johnson had grown sick of his bargain, and made application to the court to set aside the sale and permit him to withdraw
the purchase-money. This was refused, and the sale confirmed.
Johnson then offered to turn the road over to the plaintiff, or any
holders of the first-mortgage bonds who would pay him the amount
of his bid within a period of some fifty days. This offer was communicated to the plaintiff by its agent, Sully, and declined.
It is clear, from the evidence, that the defendants Johnson and
Horner and the citizens of Helena wished to have the bondholders
purchase the road. They were extremely anxious that the road
should be completed, and believed that its purchase by the bondholders would insure that result, and that nothing else would.
After the plaintiff and other bondholders declined to take Johnson's
purchase off his hands, he proceeded, as fast as he could raise means
for that purpose, to put the necessary repairs and improvements
upon the road, which embraced 50,000 new ties, five miles of new
iron, the rebuilding of nearly all the bridges and culverts, raising
the road-bed in many places, and expensive repairs of the rolling
stock. He afterwards sold a half interest in the property to his
co-defendant, John J. Homer. Not long after the purchase, railroad securities and property in the south appreciated very much,
and, although the road in question was but a fragment, its value
was enhanced by the general and unprecedented increase in the
value of all railroad property. Its value was further enhanced by
the construction of a trunk line-not projected when Johnson purchased-from Missouri to Texas, which connects with its western
terminus at Clarendon, and by the extensive repairs and improvements put upon the road, which altogether made it worth from
$100,000. to $200,000 at the time this suit was commenced, sup-
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posing it to be free from incumbrances prior in time to the mortgage
under which defendants claim.
The bill, which was filed five years after the sale, seeks to charge
Johnson as a trustee for the bondholders on general charges of
fraud against him, the Union Trust Company, and others, relating
to the foreclosure and sale, and for alleged inadequacy of price.
The latter charge was abandoned at the hearing, the counsel for
the plaintiff conceding on the argument that the road sold for all
it was worth in its then condition, and in view of the question of
the lien for the state aid bonds.
The rule is well settled that in the absence of fraud the beneficiaries in railway mortgages are bound by what is done by their
trustee:
"In such cases the trustee is in court for and on behalf of the
beneficiaries ; and they, though not parties, are bound by the judgment, unless it is impeached for fraud or collusion between him and
the adverse party. The principle which underlies this rule has always
been applied in proceedings relating to railway mortgages where a
trustee holds the security for the benefit of the bondholders :" Kerison v. Stewart, 93 U. S. 155, 160. "The trustee of a railroad
mortgage represents the bondholders in all legal proceedings carried on by him affecting his trust, to which they are not actual
parties, and whatever binds him, if he acts in good faith, binds
them. If a bondholder not a party to the suit can under any circumstances bring a bill of review, he can only have such relief as
the trustee would be entitled to in the same form of proceeding :"
Shaw v. Railroad Co., 100 U. S. 605, 611. Although the bill
charges fraud in general terms upon the trustee, in connection with
the foreclosure suit, there is not a syllable of evidence to support
the charge.
One point much relied on at the hearing to support the bill was
that the bill to foreclose was filed by the trustee without the written
request of the holders of one-third in amount of the bonds then
outstanding, as required by the twelfth article of the mortgage ;
and that the'decree requiring the payment of the principal sum
of the mortgage debt was therefore erroneous. The late cases of
the Cliicaqo, D. & . Railroad Co. v. Fosdick, 106 U. S. 47,
are cited in support of this contention. The ruling in those cases
does not aid the plaintiff's case, for several reasons: 1. The mortgage in the case at bar contains an important provision on
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the subject which was not contained in the mortgage under
consideration 'in .the cases cited, and which would seem to
authorize all that was done by the trustee, and the decree
of the court for the whole debt. 2. It was undoubtedly competent for the trustee to file a bill to foreclose for the interest
actually due, and that largely exceeded in amount the value of the
road. 3. The railroad company does not complain of the decree,
and the plaintiff is estopped to do so by reason of having filed and
proved in the master's office more than one-third in amount of all
the bonds issued, with full knowledge of all the facts. This was
a ratification of the action of the trustee. 4. If it be conceded
that the requisition of the holders of one-third in amount of the
bonds was indispensable to authorize a decree for the full sum of
the mortgage debt, that fact would not affect the jurisdiction of the
court or the validity of its decree when collaterally attacked. The
jurisdiction of the court to pronounce a decree in the case is not
contested, and if it rendered a decree for more than was due it was
error merely, which might have been corrected on appeal by the
proper party in apt time. But if it be conceded that it was an
error, it was one of which the trustee could not complain ; and
there being- no fraud on the part of the trustee the bondholders are
as much bound as the trustee, and cannot avoid the decree in any
form of proceeding: Shaw v. Railroad Co., supra.
It is needless to discuss in detail the charges of fraud contained
in the bill. The plaintiff has lost all right to be heard by its own
gross laches. In excuse for the long delay, the bill alleges the
plaintiff was ignorant of the facts until recently. This allegation
is. not true. The plaintiff's agent had notice of all the facts, and
testifies he communicated them to the plaintiff immediately after
the sale. But the bill itself does not state a case that will excuse
the delay. "A general allegation of ignorance at one time and
knowledge at another is of no effect. If the plaintiff made any
particular discovery it should be stated when it was made, what it
was, how it was made, and why it was not made sooner. * * *
There must be reasonable diligence, and the means of knowledge
are the same, then, in effect as knowledge itself:" Wood v.Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135, 140 ; Harwood v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 78;
Badger v. Badger, 2 Id. 87.
In Harwood v. Railroad Co., supra, there was a delay of five
VOL. XXX I.--4
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years, and in Twin-lick Oil Co. v. .farbury, 91 U. S. 587, there
was a delay of four years, and the court denied relief in both cases
on the ground of laches. In the case last cited, the defendant, at
the time he purchased the corporate property, was a stockholdei
and director in the company, and. the bill, which sought to charge
him as a trustee, was filed by the company, and not,. as in the
case at bar, by a bondholder. All parties in this case were authorized to bid at the sale, and the fact that Johnson was president of the railroad company and the plaintiff a holder of bonds
of the company did not in itself raise a trust relation between
them which would entitle the latter to charge the former as a trustee,
and at his election treat his purchase as though made in trust for
its benefit. It could only avail itself'of Johnson's purchase by
virtue of some agreement or fraudulent act on his part. The plaintiff does not rely upon any agreement, and if the conduct of Johnson was such as to entitle the plaintiff to avoid his purchase or
avail itself of his bid, it ought to have exercised the right within
a reasonable period. It could not delay the assertion of this right
to enable it to decide, in the light of subsequent events, whether it
would or not be profited by its assertion.
In Twin-lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, supra, Mr. Justice MrlLER
says: "No delay for the purpose of enabling the defrauded party
to speculate upon the chances which the future may give him of
deciding profitably to himself whether he will abide by his bargain
or rescind it, is allowed in a court of equity." That is precisely
what the plaintiff aski the court to permit it to do in this case. It
declined to take the property at the price bid by Johnson, because
as matters then appeafed, that seemed to be all or more than the
property was worth. It was patent to all at the time of the sale
that the alternative would be presented to the purchaser of expending at once a large sum for repairs and improvements on the
road, or abandoning its use as a railroad altogether. And after
these expenditures had been made it was exceedingly doubtful
whether the earnings of the road would equal its running expenses.
In view of these facts, and the further fact that it was claimed
then that the lien for the $1,850,000 state aid bonds issued to the
road was paramount to the lien of the mortgage under .which the
road was sold (which is still an open question so far as relates to
this road), it is not surprising that it was difficult to find a bidder
for the property at the minimum price fixed in the decree, or that
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the plaintiff declined to take it at that price. Years afterwards,
and when the .property had greatly increased in value from causes
not then foreseen, and from extensive repairs and improvements put
upon it, and after other interests had intervened, and the plaintiff
erroneously supposed the question of the lien for the amount of the
state aid bonds was out of the way, it files this bill, and asks that
it be permitted to do now what it declined to do then, take the property at Johnson's bid, and that he be decreed to be a trustee and
required to account.
A more inequitable demand, considering the facts of the case,
was probably never addressed to a court of equity. If it was settled that there was no lien on the road to secure the state aid bonds,
the case would not be any more favorable for the plaintiff. Having
declined to take the risk of purchasing the property when it was
doubtful whether the investment would entail a loss or yield a profit
it should not be permitted at this late day and in the light of subsequent events to reconsider that resolution. The profits, if in the
end there are any, justly belong to the purchaser, who took the risk,
and whose labor and capital have added largely to the value of the
property. As was said by the court in Wood v. Carpenter, supra,
it is impossible "to avoid the conviction that the plaintiff's conduct
marks the difference between forethought in one condition of things
and afterthought in another."
Laches need not be pleaded. If the objection is apparent on the
bill itself, it may be taken by demurrer: Aiaxwell v. JKennedy, 8
How. 222; Lansdale v. Smith, 16 Cent. Law J. 28 ; s. c. 1 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 350. And if the cause, as it appears on the hearing, is
liable to the objection, the court will refuse relief, without inquiring
whether there is a demurrer, plea or answer setting it up: Sullivan
v. Portland Railroad Co., 94 U. S. 811; Badger v. Badger, 2
Wall. 95.
The plaintiff and all other purchasers of the first-mortgage bonds
have undoubtedly lost the money invested in them. But they did
not lose it by the foreclosure proceedings. It was lost from the
instant it was invested in bonds secured by a mortgage on a road
which had an existence only in name. If they have any just ground
of complaint, it would seem to be against those whose representations induced them to purchase the bonds, and who probably used
the proceeds for purposes other than building the road.
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Let a decree be entered dismissing the bill for want of equity, at
plaintiffs costs.
AUTHORITY

TO isSUE

RECEIVERS

mortgagee taking
possession of tie property mortgaged
may expend upon it such sums as
arc necessary to preserve it from waste
and dilapidation which might otherwise
depreciate the security in value, or even
render it entirely worthless. So a receiver taking possession on behalf of
the mortgagee may expend money to
stay waste or destruction of the security
of his mortgagee. He may do whatever
the mortgagee might himself do to preserve the property.
This is true of receivers of railways.
They may use so much as may be necessary of the revenues of the road, during
their possession of it, for the purpose of
operating it and keeping it in good repair, suitable for the safe and rapid conveyance of persons and property. A
stronger reason exists in the case of receivbrs of railways for allowing them
thus to expend the revenues of the road,
or even to borrow money to keep it in
good running order and repair, than in
the eases of receivers in possession of
property purely private, such as a farm
or a factory. This reason is the protection of the public in the continued use
of the railway as a public highway. "If
it were not for the public quality belonging to them, for the injury that would be
done to the interests of whole communities that have become dependent on .a
railroad f~r accommodation in a thousand
things, a chancellor might say to the
parties most interested: ' Unless you
furnish means for the protection of this
property, which does not itself afford an
adequate income for this purpose, it may
become a dilapidated and useless wreck.'
But the inconvenience and loss which
this would inflict on the population of
large districts, coupled with the benefit
to parties who perhaps are powerless to
take care of themselves, of preventing
CERTIvICATEs.-A

tie rapid diminution of value and derangement and disorganization which
would otherwise result, seem to require
-not for the completion of an unfinished
work, or tile improvement, beyond what
is necessary for its preservation, of an
existing one, but to keep it up, to conserve it as a railroad property, if the
court has been obliged to take possession
of it-that the court should borrow money
for that purpose, if it can not otherwise
do so in sufficiently large sums, by causing negotiable certificates of indebtedness to be issued constituting a lien on
the proceeds of the property, and redeemable when it is sold or disposed of
by the court."
Per MAsNING, J.,
Meyer v. Johnston, 53 Ala. 348. And
to the effect that a receiver may borrow
money to preserve in good repair and
condition the railway property intrusted
to him, see Hoover v. M. 4- G. L. Railroad Co., 29 N. J. Eq. 5; Meyer v.
J'ohnston, 53 Ala. 237 ; Kennedy v. St.
P. 4- P. Railroad Co., 2 Dill. 448; Jerome v. McCarter, 94 U. S. 734; Bank
of Montrealv. C. C. 4- W. RailroadCo.,
7 Cent. L. J. 267; 48 Iowa 518; Stan-'
ton v. A. 4- C. Railroad Co., 2 Woods
506; Wallace v. Loomis, 97 U. S. 146;
Cowdrey v. Railroad Co., I Woods 331 ;
V. 4- C. Railroad Co. v. V. C. Railroad
Co., 50 Vt. 14; Am. Ry. Rep. 497.
But may a court authorize a receiver
to borrow money to buy new rolling
stock, or new shops, to complete an unfinished road, or, still further, to build a
new road as an extension, branch or
feeder of the railway in his possession ?
Several cases answer this question affirmatively. In Gibert v. Washington
City, 4-c., Railroad Co., 33 Grat. 586,
the court, without deciding the question
as to the power of the court as an original proposition to make such expenditure,
affirmed an order authorizing the disbursement of $10,000 for the construe-
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tion of a branch road by the receiver, he
having in fact already constructed it for
about $8000, it proving a profitable
feeder to the main line, and no objection
to the expenditure having been made for
more than two years. In Me.yer v.
Johnston, 53 Ala. 339, -341, the court
refer to manuscript opinions in the cases
of Southerland, Trustee, v. Lake Superior
Ship Canal Railroad 6- 1. Co., before U.
S. district Judge LoNGYEAR, at Detroit,
and Hyde v. Soders Point Railroad Co.,
wherein receivers were authorized to
borrow money to complete unfinished
work. The former case came before the
U. S. Supreme Court sub nom. Jerome
v. McCarter, 94 U. S. 738, and the receiver's action in raising money to complete the work-a canal-by the issuance
and sale of certificates of indebtedness,
secured by his mortgage, was justified.
"The canal was unfinished," say the
court, "and there were in the receiver's
hands no funds to finish it. Hence there
was a necessity for making the order
which the court made-a necessity attending the administration of the trust
the court had undertaken. The order
was necessary alike for the lien creditors
See also
and for the mortgagors."
Wallace v. Loomis, 97 U. S. 162; Stanton v. Ala. 4- Chat. R1.R. Co., 2 Woods
516 ; Wallace v. Loomis, 97 U. S. 146.
In Kennedy v. St. P. 4- P. Railroad
Co., 2 Dill. 448, to prevent a valuable
land grant in favor of a railroad company from lapsing, a receiver was appointed at the instance of bondholders of
the company, whcse principal security
was said lands, and at their desire he was
empowered to borrow money to complete
the unfinished portions of the road, and
his certificates were made a first lien on
the road and lands of the company.
In Miltenberger Y. Railway Company,
106, United States 206, authority
was given the receiver to purchase
new rolling stock, complete five miles
of railway, build a bridge, and pay indebtedness to connecting roads for freight
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and ticket balances incurred before the
receiver was appointed. By the construction of the five miles of railway and
the bridge the company secured large
donations in land and money, besides
adding greatly to its business, and was
enabled to transact properly the business
it already had. Any indebtedness created by the receiver for these purposes
was made a "first lien prior to all incumbrances upon said road." The order
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
the United States.
From these cases the power to authorize a receiver in a proper case to issue
and sell certificates to purchase new
equipment, or to build new roads, would
seem to be pretty firmly established, at
least in extraordinary cases where such
action by the receiver is deemed necessary for the security of the mortgagees.
But in ifeier v. Johnston, 53 Ala. 340,
it was pointed out that, in preceding
cases, the issue and tile sale of receiver's
certificates had been consented to by the
prior mortgagees; and it was decided
that a railroad receiver could not, in
order to raise money to complete the
road, create liens upon its property
which will displace older liens. It was
sought to compare such certificates to a
bottomry bond, whose lien takes precedence of all prior claims on the vessel.
The court refused to take this view. "A
ship far from home, in distress and
without resource, must perish, and perhaps her crew with her, if a bottomry
bond, given then for repairs and supplies
shall not have precedence of other liens
upon the vessel. But the court does not
consider a railroad on terrafirma so beyond the reach of help from those who
own it or are concerned in it, as to justify the adoption in such a case, of the rule
relating to a ship abroad and about to
v. Johnston, 53 Ala.
perish." iMleyer
345.
It was further pointed out that the
railway company could not itself issue
such obligations and give them the first
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lien upon its property as against prior
mortgagees or other lien holders. Its
contracts were inviolable and it would
not be permitted to impair them. Further,
referring to the provision in the United
States Constitution prohibiting a state
from impairing contracts, the court said:
"And certainly a court which is a portion of the government of a State cannot have power which is denied to the
state in convention assembled. If, therefore, the action of a chancellor in this
cause goes to the extent of taking the
property of the defendant corporation
into his hands for the purpose, through
his appointees, of completing an unfinished work, or of enlarging or improving a finished one, beyond what is
necessary for its preservation, and to
that end--of raising money by charging
the railroad and its appurtenances with
liens which are to supersede older ones
without the consent of the holders of
these, he has inadvertently passed beyond
the boundaries of a chancellor's jurisdiction. In our opinion no such power
is vested or resides in any judicial
tribunal."
Id., 345, 346.
The borrowing of money by a receiver
is certainly discouraged even by those
courts which have permitted it. The
Supreme Court of the United States, in
Shaw v. Railroad Co., 100 U. S. 612,
say: "For some reason the idea of a
receiver and receiver's certificates seems
to have been abandoned, and what to our
minds was a much more desirable plan,
adopted. The power of the courts ought
never to be used in enabling railroad
mortgagees to protect their securities by
borrowing money to complete unfinished
roads, except under extraordinary circumstances. It is always better to do
what was done here whenever it can be;
that is to say, reorganize the enterprise
on the basis of existing mortgages as
stock, or something which is equivalent,
and by a new mortgage, with a lien superior to the old, raise the money which
is required without asking the courts to

engage in the business of railroad building. The result, so far as incumbering
the mortgage security is concerned, is the
same substantially in both cases, while
the reorganization places the whole enterprise in the hands of those immediately
interested in its-successful prosecution."
If a receiver has by direction of the
court taken moneys and used them,
which should not have been so taken;
since they belonged to other parties, the
court will, for the rectification of the
error, order the amount to be returned
with interest, to the parties entitled to
it :. Afeyer v. Johnston, 53 Ala. 347.
While a receiver may borrow money,
authority to do so for the purpose of completing a branch, does not warrant a receiver in contracting for municipal aid
to enable him to build such a branch:
Smith v. McCullough, 3 Am. & E. R. R.
Cases 159.
Where the net earnings of a railroad
company are sufficient to purchase rolling stock and equipment, they should be
so applied, and receivers will not 'be
authorized to create a loan secured by a car
trust for their purchase, merely in order
to allow the earnings to be applied to the
payment of interest due the bondholders :
Taylor v. P.44 R. .RailroadCo., 9 Fed.
Rep. I ; 3Am. &Eng. R. R. Cases 177.
Statutory receivers are strictly limited
by the authority conferred upon them by
the statute; thus in Tennessee v. .E. 4K.
Railroad Co., 6 B. J. Lea 353, a statute
of the state provided that in case of the
failure of the companies to pay certain
bonded indebtedness, the governor should
appoint a receiver of the road. Upon
the happening of the contingency, he did
appoint a receiver, and the question was
as to his power to bind the state to pay
an indebtedness for materials, &c.,
created by him as receiver. It was also
sought to have these debts declared a
first lien upon the proceeds of the sale
of the road.
As to the position that the receiver,
being an agent of the state, his contract
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was the contract of the state, it was decided that this position, if true, would
only make the petitionets creditors of the
state, and would give them no rights
whatever as against the property of the
railroad company, nor any lien upon the
property of the state, but only a claim
against the state, not enforceable by
action on account of the state's exempdon from suit. It was also decided that
the statute authorizing the appointment
of the receiver, did not authorize him to
contract debts to be paid otherwise than
out of the earnings of the road, and
further, that there was no obligation on
the state to continue the receivership
until the current indebtedness of the receivership was paid. The fact that the
indebtedness created by the receiver, enhanced the value of the railway property,
was decided not to add any strength to
the claim, and the petitioners were held
not entitled to the relief sought.
An application by receivers to issue
certificates to cover certain expenses, and
an order of court thereon, accordingly
does not bind the receivers or the trust
fund to pay particular items of such expenses, the propriety of whose payment
is not before the court. And if it appears that certain creditors might at any
time have retaken the property for which
they ask payment in certificates, and
further, that such payment would be to
the disadvantage of the trust fund, the
court will not compel the receivers to
make such 'payment in certificates: Coe
v. N. J. Mid. Railroad Co., 27 N. J.
Eq. 37.
If prior mortgagees do not assent to
receivers' liens, these should be made expressly subject to the prior mortgages :
In re U. S. Roll. St. Co., 55 How. Pr.
286.
NATURE AND NEGOTIABILITY.-Re-

ceivers' certificates are not debts of the
company, but of the receivers, backed by
the pledged faith of the court that the
property on the proceeds of which they
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are charged is in its possession, subject
to be, and that it will be disposed of by
it for the payment of them.: Meyer v.
Johnston, 53 Ala. 349. If the fund or
property in the hands of the court be not
sufficient to pay the certificates in full,
then holders of them are entitled only to
apro ratashare of such proceeds : Turner
v. P. 4- S. Railroad Co., 95 I1. 134.
Generally such certificates contain no
express promise to pay,, but merely the
receiver's acknowledgment of indebtedness. The fund against which they are
drawn is uncertain. There is no one
personally liable for their payment, which
can only be coerced by application to the
court which issued them. Only the fund
or property under control of such court
is bound for their payment, and that only
when it is equitable to charge such fund
with their payment. While, therefore,
it may be within the power of the court
to authorize the issuance and sale by the
receiver of negotiable paper, yet ordinarily feceivers' certificates are not negotiable: Turner v. P. 4- S. Railroad
Co., 95 Ill. 134; Union Trust Co. v. C.
6- L. H. Railroad Co., 7 Fed. Rep. 513 ;
Staunton v. A. I. C. Railroad Co., 2
Woods 506 ; Bank of Montreal v. C. 4
C. Railroad Co., 48 Ia. 518 ; iNewbold
v. P. 6- S. Railroad Co., 5 Bradw. 367.
Nor can the receiver appoint an agent
to negotiate them for him. Their issuance and sale is a trust personal to the
receiver, and he cannot delegate it to
another, and relieve himself of responsibility: Union Trust Co., v. C. 6- L. I.
Railroad Co., 7 Fed. Rep. 513.
If a court orders a receiver to issue
certificates of indebtedness, for a specific
purpose, to be made payable to the persons to whom it is delivered, or order,
and one is issued to A., or bearer, which
is negotiated by mere delivery, the holder
will take the same subject to all equitable
defences against the payee, and the
printed order of the court on the back is
notice to him that it was made payable
to bearer, contrary to the order of the
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court authorizing its issue: Turner v.
P. 4- S. Railroad Co., 95 111. 134.
So, a certificate issued by a receiver to
pay debts and expenses incurred by his
predecessor, but which is not in fact used
on account of any indebtedness made by
the former receiver, and for which the
receiver issuing it received no benefit,
will not be paid at the suit of the payee,
or even of a holder for value: Turner v.
P. 4- S. Railroad Co., 95 Ill. 134; see
also Union Trust Co. v. C. 4" L. H.
Railroad Co., 7 Fed. Rep. 513.
In Humphreys v. Allen, 101 .1ll. 490,
the court below had authorized the issue
and sale of receivers' certificates to pay
for indebtedness of the company incurred
before the receiver was appointed, and
with full notice of a prior mortgage.
The Supreme Court express no opinion
as to the power of the court to authorize
the issuance of certificates for such purpose, but hold that if the holder of railroad bonds secured by trust deeds on the
road, having notice of the appointment
of a receiver, and an order of court
directing him on his petition to issue certificates of indebtedness on which to raise
money to discharge a chattel mortgage
on the personal property of the company,
and to pay taxes, current expenses, &c.,
and making such certificates a prior and
first lien on all the property of the
company, desires to question the power
of the court to make such order, he must
do so before such certificates are issued
and sold to bonafide purchasers,or paid out
to creditors of the company. After their
issue and sale it will be too late for him,
or purchasers from him with notice of
the facts, to raise the question whether
the subject-matter to which the certificates were applied, was within the scope
of the power of the court in the preservation of the property for the benefit of
all concerned. See also Langdon v. V.
4. C. Railroad Co., 53 Vt. 228.
Especially will bondholders be bound
when they constitute a committee of their
number to represent them in matters ap-

pertaining to the management of the
property, and such committee consents to
the issuance of receivers' certificates :
Laynqdon v. V. 4. C. Railroad Co., 53
Vt. 228. But see dissenting opinion by
WALXR, J., in Humphreys v. Allen,
101 Ill. 490.
INTBREST.-Provision may be made
in such certificates for the payment otl
interest ; but the court cannot authorize
the receiver to pay usurious rates of interest either directly, as by making them
draw .a greater than the legal rate of
interest, or indirectly, as by fixing their
rate of interest at the highest legal rate,
and authorizing their sale at a discount.
Meyer v. Johnston, 53 Ala. 352.
PRACTICE.-If the order authorizing
the issue of certificates is made without
proper notice to all concerned, or is
otherwise irregular, the proper mode of
objecting to it is by application to the
chancellor to vacate and set it aside.
Meyer v. Johnston, 53 Ala. 350.
PAYENeT.-The usual mode of compelling payment of receivers' certificates
is by application to the court authorizing
their issue. But suppose the property in
charge of the receiver has been sold and
the court has made a final decree without
providing for the payment of outstand
ing certificates. If the receiver has been
discharged, he cannot be sued. The
court no longer has either the suit or the
property in its control, and is powerless
to compel payment of its obligations.
Perhaps a purchaser would take the property subject to all claims against the
receiver, which might therefore be enforced against him. This was so decided in Farnzers' L. 4. T. Co. v. Central Railroadof Iowa, 7 Fed. Rep. 537.
But in that case the court had especially
reserved jurisdiction upon final deree to
enforce as liens upon the property all
liabilities incurred by the receiver.
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REQUEST THAT TRUSTEE FonEcosE.

-The whole debt may be made to become due upon any dfault in the payment of interest or of principal. Mallory v. TV. S. H. Railroad Co., 35 N. Y.
Superior Ct. 174. The writer has been
able to find but one case especially construing the request to the trustee to foreclose. In Railroad Company v. losdic, 106 United States 47, it is held
that the clause must be read in connection with the clause in the same article
relating to the declaration of default.
"The whole article must be taken together." It is to be construed stricti
juris, with a leaning, if need be, in favor
of the debtor, since the declaration of
default is in the nature of a penalty or
forfeiture.
It was further decided that the written
request to the trustees to foreclose was a
necessary condition precedent to the
foreclosure proceedings; that it was not
optional with the trustees to foreclose
without such request, but that the latter
was intended to secure to a majority
of the bondholders "the right to veto
the proceeding of the trustees." "Many
cases may be mentioned," say the court,
"to illustrate the importance in their interests of such a control, rather than to
put it in the power of one, or a minority,
to require all to accept what the majority
might consider to be premature and less
valuable satisfaction for their existing
security. The larger number might think
it to their advantage even to defer the
collection of their overdue interest, much
less not to anticipate the payment of the
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principal, even when the security was
ample to meet both; for they might esteem the ultimate investment higher than
present payment. While they could not
and ought not to prevent others, even a
single individual, from exacting the
promptest payment of what is due and
may be important as current income, by
legal process, they may nevertheless
rightfully object to an anticipation of
payment that may in their opinion prove
to be a sacrifice. And this becomes especially important when the present value
of the security is insufficient to prepay
the incumbrance, but contains the solid
promise of future indemnity as an investment."
Chief Justice WAITE and Justice HAnLAN dissented, holding that if no request
were made, the trustees were not precluded from commencing foreclosure proceedings on their own motion. Railroad
Co. v. Fosdick, supra.
It has also been decided that a trustee
will be left to exercise his discretion as
to the time of making sale under a decree
of foreclosure, and as to making sal at
all pending an appeal from the decree
which the appeal does not supersede.
Farmers' Loan 6- Trust Co. v. Central
Railroad Co. of Iowa, 4 Dill. 546.
And this, notwithstanding a committee
of the bondholders requested the trustee
to order a special master to proceed with
the sale, and tried to compel him to
accede to their request by application to
the court.
ADELBERT HAMILTON.
Chicago.

ZIMMERMAN v. DEVIN.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
ZIMMERMAN v. DEVIN.
Where a physician agrees in writing, for a valuable consideration, not to practice
his profession in a certain city or in its vicinity, he is bound by his contract, and the
remedy against him is by injunction. The injunction, however, should be precise,
and define exactly what is meant by " in its vicinity." A distance of ten miles
from the city limits on every side is suggested as being a proper area in this case.

APPEAL from Barry.

I

Clement Smith, for complainant.
.Knappen & Van Arman, for defendant and appellant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHERWOOD, J.-The parties in this case are both practising physicians residing in the city of Hastings, and carrying on the business of their profession. On the 4th day of June 1881, the defendant entered into the following contract with the complainant:
"In consideration of the sum of $500, to me in hand paid, this
4th day of June, A. D. 1881, by Frank B. Zimmerman, M.D., the
receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged and confessed, I agree as
follows: To remain in the city of Hastings and vicinity, in the
active practice of medicine with said Zimmerman, for a period not
exceeding six months from this date, and to divide equally the receipts from said practice with him. At the end of six months from
this date, I agree to relinquish and yield up to him my practice,
and remove from said city and vicinity, and refrain from practising
medicine in said city and vicinity, after said six months, for at least
the term of five years immediately succeeding said six months, and
I reserve the right to remove from said city and give up said practice as aforesaid any time after this date and before said six months
shall expire." By agreement of the parties the time for defendant to
quit practice and leave said city was extended until the 1st day of
April 1882.
Complainant's bill avers that the said defendant, instead of complying with his agreement to quit practice in the city of Hastings
and vicinity, thus made with the complainant, when said 1st day of
April arrived absolutely refused so to do, and from that time to
the present has continued to practice his profession in Hastings
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and vicinity, and avers his intention to continue his practice
there.
The answer adinits defendant's continuance in practice at Hastings, and avers his right to continue by reason of certain understandings and dealings between the parties had subsequent to the
making of the contract. The case was heard at the Barry circuit
on pleadings and proofs, and the circuit judge made a decree in
accordance with the prayer of complainant's bill.
Upon an examination of the record we think the conclusion of
the circuit judge was correct. It very clearly shows a failure of
the defendant to comply with his written agreement with the complainant and which non-compliance, according to the testimony of
defendant himself, could scarcely fail to be an injury to complainant.
A discussion of the testimony is unnecessary, and could serve
no useful purpose. It is sufficient to say the equity of the case
is clearly shown to be with the complainant, and but one thing
requires further notice-the decree restrains the defendant from
practising his profession "in the city of -Hastingsand vicinity."
This clause of the decree is- somewhat indefinite as to the extent
of territory to which it applies, and may give rise to further misunderstanding between the parties. For the purpose of obviating
any difficulty of this kind, the decree made by the circuit judge
should be so modified as to make certain the limits of its operOf course, the extent of 'territory included in the term
ation.
"vicinity of the city" must necessarily depend in a great measure
upon the size of the city, its location and particular surroundings;
and under all the circumstances as they appear upon this record,
I think the territory surrounding the city for the distance of ten
miles from its corporate boundaries a reasonable limitation, and
one which may be safely regarded within the contemplation of the
parties when they made their contract.
The decree at the circuit court should be modified accordingly,
and, thus modified, must be affirmed, with costs.
CAMPBELL and CoOLEY, JJ., concurred.

agree with the court below that the case esGRAVES, C. J.-I
tablished by complainant entitled him to relief, and I also agree
that the proper mode of relief is by injunction. But I think the
decree ought to be more precise. It pursues the wording of the
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agreement, that the defendant should forbear business in the city
of Hastings

and "vicinity,"

and fails to

prescribe what ter-

ritory the parties understood by this expression.

They meant

by it to identify the space from which the defendant was to be

excluded, but they did not use it as amounting to a definite
description.

The word itself is entirely indefinite as a term of

description of the bounds of the territory, and it fails to fix in
such manner as it should, for the purpose of an injunction, the
The defendparticular limits which the defendant is not to pass.
ant is entitled to be informed, on the face of the injunction, when
he is not to act under peril of attachment, and it

ought not to

be left as a matter of speculation or conjecture. I am inclined to
think that the sense of the parties is substantially answered by
regarding the city limits, and a space extending ten miles on all
sides therefrom, as the area from which the defendant was to be

excluded, and I think the decree should be so varied as to correspond with this view, and in all other respects affirmed.
The rule laid down in the leading
English case upon the subject, is to the
effect that all general restraints of trade
are void: Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P.
Wins. 181. Still the objection that it
is in restraint of trade, if certain other
conditions are complied with, will not
invalidate the contract. What these are
will be our purpose to note. The case
of Lange v. Werk, 2 Ohio St. 519, the
leading American authority, holds that
to render a contract in restraint of trade
valid, it must appear, Ist, That the
restraint is partial. 2d, That it is
founded on good consideration. 3d,
That it is reasonable and not oppressive : Bremer v. Marshall, 4 C. E. Green
Ch. 537; Wright v. Ryder, 35 Cal. 342.
It is generally conceded that while a
restraint is under certain circumstances
void, yet, where certain limitations are
imposed it becomes valid: Smalley v.
Greene, 52 Iowa 241 ; Hedge v. Lowe,
47 Id. 137 ; Cook v. Johnson, 47
Conn. 175 ; Curtis v. Gokey, 68 N. f.
300; Ellis v. Jones, 56 Ga. 504;
Hoagland v. Segur, 38 N. J. L. 230.
(Compare Doty v. Martin, 32 Mich.

462): Dwight v. Hamilton, 113 Mass.
175. Peltz v. Eichele, 62 Mo. 171 ;
Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v. WVinsor, 20
Wall. 64; Perkins v. Clay, 54 N. H.
518; Maier v. Homan, 4 Daly 168;
Guerand v. Dandelet, 32 Md. 561;
Warfield v. Booth, 33 Id. 63; Morse
Twist Drill Co. v. Morse, 103 Mass.
73; Jenkins v. Temples, 39 Ga. 655;
Gillis v. Hall, 2 Brews. 342.
THE RESTRAINT MUST 3E PARTA.

-It was early decided that a contract
which was not partial in one or more
particulars, was void. The restraint
may be partial in respect of space, of
time, and also in respect of the class of
work done. Thus in Gale v. Reed, 8
East 80, the defendant covenanted not
to exercise the business of a ropemaker
during his life, except on government
contracts, and the court held it good.
Te court also upheld the contract in
Davis v. Mason, 5 T. R. 118, where an
attorney bound himself not to practise
within London, and one hundred and
fifty miles from thence. So, also, the
contract in Whittaker v. Howe, 3 Beav.
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383, where attorneys and solicitors
agreed not to practise in Great Britain
for the space of twenty years, without
the consent of the gentlemen to whom
they had sold their business, was sustained. "The law will not permit any
one to restrain a person from doing
what his own interest and the public
welfare require that he should do.
Any deed, therefore, by which a person
binds himself not to employ his talents,
his industry or his capital, in any useful
undertaking in the kingdom, would be
void. But it may often happen that the
individual interest and general convenience under engagements not to carry on
trade, or to act in a profession in a
particular place, proper:" BEST, C. J.,
in Homer v. Aslford, 3 Bing. 328.
Partial restraints were upheld in the following cases: Dais v. Mason, 5 T. R.
118; Bunn v. Guy, 4 East 190;
Whittaker v. owe, 3 Beav. 383; Clerk
v. Comer, Cas. temp. Hardw. 53;
P-octor v. Sargent, 2 Man. & Gr. 31 ;
Rannie v. Irvine, 8 Scott N. R. 674;
Leighton v. Wales, 3 M. & W. 545;
fun~ford v. Gething, 7 C. B., N. S.
305 ; Gale v. Reed, 8 East 80; Nobles
v. Bates, 7 Cow. 307; Piercev. Woodward, 6 Pick. 206; Lange v. Werk, 2
Ohio St. 520 ; Duffg v. Shockey, 11 Ind.
71 ; 3fott v. Mott, 11 Barb. 128.
Where the contract entered into by
the parties is confined in space, it seems
the proper way is to measure the distance by the nearest way of approach to
the place whence it is to be reckoned :
Leigh v. rnd, 9 B. & C. 774 ; Atkyns
v. Kinnier, 4 Ex. 776.
Bnt it has been also held that where
no means have been provided in the deed
for measurement, it should be in a
straight line: Rex v. Saffron Walden,
9 Q. B. (N. S.) 76; Lake v. Butler, 5
E. & B. 92 ; Jewell v. Stead, 6 Id. 350;
Duignan v. Walker, I Johns. 446 Eng.
CoNs
ERATIox.-The contract in
restraint of trade must be founded upon

an adequate consideration. Says Lord
"The restraint on
one side meant to be enforced, should
in reason be co-extensive only with the
benefits meant to be enjoyed on the
other:" Gale v. Reed,*8 East 86.
The decisions in the English courts
are to the effect that the adequacy of the
consideration will not be inquired into,
and the parties must act on their own
idea as to its sufficiency: Archer v.
31arsh, 6 A. & E. 959 ; Pilkington v.
Scott, 15 M. & W. 657 ; IHitchcock
v. Coker, 6 A. & E. 439 ; Leighton v.
Wales, 3 M. & N. 551. And see
Guerand v. Dandelet, 32 Md. 561.
Still if there be a consideration for the
contract, but it is in restraint of trade,
it will, therefore, be void: Chappel v.
Brock-way, 21 Wend. 158; Lawrence v.
Kidder, 10 Barb. 641 ; Pierce v. Fuller,
8 Mass. 223. In Pierce v. Fuller,
supra, the court thought the case appearing to be a reasonable one, and
that the consideration of one dollar
having been fixed and adopted by the
parties as adequate, was sufficient in
law. Followed by Perkins v. Lyman, 9
Mass. 522. See, also, Palmer v. Stbbis, 3 Pick. 188 ; Whitney v. Slayton,
40 Maine 231. But see Ross v. Sadqbeer, 21 Wend. 166, opinion of BnoNELLENO30ROUGH:

SON, J.
IT

MUST

BE

REASONABLE.-It

is

not sufficient that the restraint be partial and founded upon consideration.
The agreement must be reasonable.
No precise boundary can be laid down,
within which the restraint would be
reasonable, and beyond which it would
be unreasonable. The circumstances of
each particular case must govern.
Thus in one case it was held, an agreement not to practice surgery within ten
miles of the plaintiff's residence, was
reasonable and should be supported :
Davis v. Jfason, 5 T. R. 118. So,
also, a contract entered into by an attorney, by which he agreed not to prac-
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tise "within London and one hundred
and fifty miles from thence," was sustained: Whittaker v. Howe, 3 Beav.
383. But an agreement by the defendant, a dentist, that he would abstain
from practise within one hundred miles
of York, was held void, on the ground
that the distance rendered it unreasonable: Homer v. Graoes, 7 Bing. 743.
A covenant by a vendor of land, for himself and his assignees, not to sell marl
from an adjacent tract of land, was held
unreasonable and void: Brewer T. Marshall, 4 C. E. Green Ch. 537; and so is
a covenant by the lessee to buy all his
merchandise at the store of the lessor:
Crawford v. Wick, 18 Ohio St. 190.
For other cases where the contract has
been held reasonable or unreasonable,
according to the circumstances, see
Chesman v. Nanbny, 2 Str. 739 ; Clerke
v. Comer, Cas. temp. Hardw. 53;
Davis v. Mason, 5 T. R. 118 ; Bunn v.
Guy, 4 East 190 ; Whittaer v. Howe,
3 Beav. 383; Leighton v. Wales, 3 M.
& W. 545 ; Linn v. Sigsbee, 67 II. 75
Callahan v. Donnolly, 45 Cal. 152;
Maier v. Homan, 4 Daly 168 ; More v.
Bonnet, 40 Cal. 251 ; Guerand v. Dandelet, 32 Md. 561.
If the contract is reasonable when
made subsequent, circumstances do not
affect its operation : Elves v. Crofts, 10
C. B. 241 ; Jones v.*Lees,, I H. & N.
189 ; Cook v. Johnson, 47 Conn. 175.
In Mallan v. May, 13 M. & W. 511,
the word "London," was construed to
mean the city of London ; but it seems
to be competent to prove in each case in
what sense the word was used : Beckford v. Crutwell, I M. & Rob. 187;
5 C. & P. 242. But the question of the
extent of territory included in the name
of a place, must be left to the jury;
neither can it be demurred to because
of the uncertainty: Blanding v. Sargent, 33 N. H. 245.
If the restriction as to place be not
unreasonable, the fact that it is indefi-

nite as to time does not invalidate the
contract: Bowser v. Bliss, 7 Blackf.
344; Beard v. Dennis, 6 Porter 204;
McClurg's Appeal, 8 P. F. Smith 51 ;
Cook v. Johnson, 47 Conn. 175; and
where the covenant is valid at common
law, it will be specifically enforced in
equity; McClurg'sAppeal, supra; Beard
v. Dennis, supra; Palmer v. Graham, I
Parsons's Eq. 476.
In Nobles v. Bates, 7 Cow. 307, the
agreement not to carry on a certain
trade within twenty miles of a certain
stand, was held binding. See Alger v.
Thacher, 19 Pick. 51 ; Vickery v.
Welch, 19 Id. 523 ; Ross v. ,Sadgbeer,
21 Wend. 166 ; Jarvisv. Peck, 1 Hoff.
Ch. 479 ; Grasselliv. Lowden, 11 Ohio
St. 349.
There is some conflict as to the divisibility of these contracts. Thus, where
a contract was made not to carry on a
certain business in the United States or
a specified county therein, it was held
that while the contract was void as to
the former, it might be sustained as to
the latter, upon the authority of Green
v. Price, 13 M. & W. 698; Beard v.
Dennis, 6 Porter (Ind.) 204; contra,
More v. Bonnet, 40 Cal. 251.
Injunction seems to be the proper
remedy, where a breach of the agreement is threatened, in cases of this
nature: Benwell v. Inns, 24 Bear. 307 ;
Hodgson v. Cappard, 30 L. J. Ch. 20;
McClurg's Appeal, 8 P. F. Smith 51 ;
Butler v. Burleson, 16 Vt. 176 ; Whittaker v. Rowe, 3 Beav. 383 ; .1forrisv.
Colman, 18 Vesey 436; Rolfe v. Rolfe,
15 Simm. 88; Nicholls v. Stretton, 7
Beav. 42; Harrison v. Gardner, 2
Madd. 198 ; Howard v. Woodward, 10
Jur. N. S. 1123; Doty v. Martin, 32
Mich. 462; Morgan v. Perhamus, 36
Ohio St. 517 ; Dwight v. Hamilton, 113
1
Mass. 175.
An isox G. McKEwr.
Detroit, Mich.
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Supreme Court of the United States.
CANADA SOUTHERN RAILROAD CO. v. GEBHARD.
Every person who deals with a foreign corporation impliedly subjects himself to
such laws of the foreign government affecting the powers and obligations of the corporation, as the known and established policy of that government authorizes; and
whatever is done by such government in furtherance of that policy which binds
subjects of the government in like situation with himself, will necessarily bind
him.
Except in the states of the United States where the passage of laws impairing the
obligation of contracts is forbidden, a statutory provision for binding the minority
of the holders of railroad bonds by the will of the majority is valid, and there is no
reason why such provision may not be made as to existing as well as to prospective
obligations.
An act of the rarliament of Canada approving a scheme of arrangement of the
affairs of a railroad company, which scheme had received the assent of a majority
of the bondholders, enacted that the scheme should be deemed to be assented to by
all the holders o( the mortgage bonds of the company. Held, that this act was

binding on citizens of the United States who were holders of the bonds of the company at the time of its enactment.
THE opinion of the court was delivered by
WAITE, C. J.-What is now known as the Canada Southern
Railway Company was originally incorporated on the 28th of February 1868, by the Legislature of the Province of Ontario, Canada,
to build and operate a railroad in that province between the Detroit and Niagara rivers, and was given power to borrow money in
the province or elsewhere, and issue negotiable coupon bonds therefor, secured by a mortgage on its property, "for completing, maintaining, and working the railway."
Under this authority the
company, on the 2d of January 1871, at Fort Erie, Canada, made
and issued a series of negotiable bonds, falling due in the year
1906, amounting in all to $8,703,000, with coupons for semiannual interest attached, payable, principal and interest, at the
Union Trust Company, in the city of New York. To secure. the
payment of both principal and interest as they matured, a trust
mortgage was executed by the company covering "the railway of
said company, its lands, tolls, revenues present and future, property
and effects, franchises and appurtenances." Every bond showed
on its face that it was of this kind and thus secured.
Before the 31st of December 1873, the company became satisfied
that it would be unable to meet the interest on these bonds maturing
in the coming January, and so it requested the holders to fund
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their coupons falling due January 1st 1874, July 1st 1874,
and January 1st 1875, by converting them into new bonds payable
on the 1st of January 1877, and by so doing only, in legal effect,
extend the time for the payment of the interest, without destroying
the lien of the coupons under the mortgage, or otherwise affecting
the obligation of the old bonds. Some of the bondholders funded
their coupons, in accordance with this proposition, and accepted
the extension bonds, but, under the arrangement, their coupons
were not to be cancelled until the new bonds were paid.
In this condition of affairs, the Parliament of Canada, on the
26th of May 1874, enacted that the Canada Southern Railway,
which was the railway built by the Can4da Southern Railway Company under its provincial act of incorporation, "be declared to be a
work for the general advaitage of Canada," and a "body corporate
and politic within the jurisdiction of Canada," for all the purposes
mentioned in, and with all the franchises conferred by, the several
incorporating acts of the legislature of the province. This, under
the provisions of the British North America Act, 1867, passed by
the Parliament of Great Britain "for the Union of Canada, Nova
Scotia and New Brunswick, and the government thereof," made
the corporation a Dominion corporation, and subjected it to the
legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada.
On the 15th of March 1875, another series of bonds, amounting
in the aggregate to $2,044,000, or thereabouts, was issued and secured by a second mortgage to trustees. After the issue of all the
bonds the company found itself unable to pay its interest, and otherwise financially embarrassed, and a joint committee, composed of
three directors and three bondholders, after full consideration of
all the circumstances, submitted to the company and to the bondholders "a scheme of arrangement of the affairs of the company,"
which was approved at a meeting of the directors on the 28th of
September 1877. This scheme contemplated the issue of $14,000,000 of thirty-year bonds, bearing three per cent. interest for three
years, and five per cent. thereafter, guaranteed, as to interest for
twenty years, by the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, the first coupons being payable January 1st 1878.
These new bonds were to be secured by a first mortgage on the
property of the company, and exchanged for old bonds at certain
specified rates. The old bonds of 1871 were to be exchanged for
new at the rate of one dollar of principal of the old for one dollar
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of the new, nothing being given either for the past due coupons or
the extension bonds executed under the arrangement in December
1873. The proposed issue of bonds was large enough to take up
all the old indebtedness at the rates proposed, whether bonded or
otherwise, and leave a surplus, to be used for acquiring further
equipment, and for such other purposes of the company as the
directors might find necessary. This scheme was formally assented
to by the holders of 108,132 shares of the capital stock out of
150,000; by the holders of the bonds of 1871 to the amount of
$7,332,000 out of $8,703,000; and by the holders of $1,590,000
of the second series of bonds out of $2,029,000 then outstanding.
Upon the-representation of these facts to the Parliament of Canada,
the "Canada Southern Arrangement Act, 1878," was passed and
assented to in the Queen's name, on the 16th of April 1878.
This statute, after reciting the scheme of arrangement, with the
causes that led to it, and that it had been assented to by the holders
of more than two-thirds of the shares of the capital stock of the
company, and by the holders of more than three-fourths of the two
classes of bonds, enacted that the scheme be authorized and approved; that the new bonds be a first charge "over all the undertaking, railway works, rolling stock and other plant" of the company, and that the new bonds be used for the purposes contemplated
by the arrangement, including the payment of the floating debt.
Section 4 is as follows:
"4. The scheme, subject to the conditions and provisos in this
act contained, shall be deemed to have been assented to by all the
holders of the original first mortgage bonds of the company, secured
by the said recited. indenture of the 15th day of December 1870,
and of all coupons and bonds for interest thereon, and also by. all
the holders of the second mortgage bonds of the company, secured
by the said recited indenture of the 15th day of March 1875, and
of all coupons thereon, and also by all the shareholders of the
Canada Southern Railway Company, and the hereinbefore recited
arrangement shall be binding upon all the said holders of the first
and second mortgage bonds and coupons, and bonds for interest
thereon respectively, and upon all the shareholders of the company."
Under the arrangement thus authorized the New York Central
and Hudson River Railroad Company executed the proposed
guaranty, and the scheme was otherwise carried into effect.
VOL. XXXII.-8
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The several defendants in error are, and always have been, citizens of the state of New York, and were,, at the time the scheme
of arrangement was entered into and confirmed by the Parliament
of Canada, the holders and owners of certain of the bonds of 1871,
and of certain extension bonds, these last having been delivered to
them respectively at the Union Trust Company in the city of New
York, where the exchanges were made, in December 1873. Neither of the defendants in error assented in fact to the scheme of
arrangement, and they did not take part in the appointment of the
joint committee. Their extension bonds have never been paid,
neither have the coupons on their bonds of 1871, which fell due on
the I st of July 1875, and since, though demanded. The company
has been at all times ready and willing to issue and deliver. to them
the full number of new bonds, with the guaranty of the New York
Central and Hudson River Railroad Company attached, that they
would be entitled to receive under the scheme of arrangement.
These suits were brought on the extension bonds and past due
coupons. The company pleaded the scheme of arrangement as a
defence, and at the trial tendered the new bonds in exchange for
the old. The circuit court decided that the arrangement was not
a bar to the actions, and gave judgments in each of them against
the company for the full amount of extension bonds and coupons
sued for. To reverse these judgments the present writs of error
were brought.
Two questions are presented for our consideration:
1. Whether the "Arrangement Act" is valid in Canada, and
had the effect of binding non-assenting bondholders within the
Dominion by the terms of the scheme; and,
2. Whether, if it did have that effect in Canada, the courts of
the United States should give it the same effect as against citizens
of the United States whose rights accrued before its passage.
1. There is no constitutional prohibition in Canada against the
passage of laws impairing the obligation of contracts, and the Parliament of the Dominion had, in 1878, exclusive legislative authority over the corporation and the general subjects of bankruptcy and
insolvency in that jurisdiction. As to all matters within its authority, the Dominion Parliament has "plenary legislative powers
as large and of the same nature as those of the Imperial Parliament :" The City of Fredericton v. M]e Queen, 8 Can. Sup.
Ct. 259.
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On the 20th of August 1867, the Parliament of Great Britain
passed the "Rail h ay Companies Act, 1867 :" 2 Stat. 1332; 30 &
31 Vict., c. 127. This act provides, among other things, for the
preparation of "Schemes of Arrangement" between railway companies, unable to meet their engagements, and their creditors, which
can be filed in the court of chancery, accompanied by a declaration
in writing, under the seal of the company, and verified by the oaths
of the directors, to the effect that the company is unable to meet
its engagements with its creditors. Notice of the filing of such a
scheme must be published in the Gazette, and the scheme is to be
deemed assented to by the holders of mortgages, bonds, debenture
stock, rent charges and preference shares, when assented to in
writing by the holders of three-fourths in value of each class of
security, and by the ordinary shareholders when assented to at an
extraordinary general meeting, specially called for that purpose.
Provision is then made for an application to the court by the company for a confirmation of the scheme. Notice of this application
must be published in the Gazette, and, after hearing, the court, if
satisfied that no sufficient objection to the scheme has been established, may confirm it. Sect. 18 is as follows:
"The scheme when confirmed shall be enrolled in the court, and
thenceforth the same shall be binding and effectual to all intents,
and the provisions thereof shall, against and in favor of the company and all parties assenting thereto or bound thereby, have the
like effect as if they had been enacted by parliament."
This act, it is apparent, was not passed to provide, for the first
time, a way in which insolvent and embarrassed railway companies
might settle and adjust their affairs, but to authorize the court of
chancery to do what had before been done by parliament. Lord
CAIRNS, L. ,J., said of it in Cambrian Railways Company's Scheme,
L. R., 3 Ch. 294: "Hitherto such companies, if they desired to
raise further capital to meet their engagements, have been forced
to go to parliament for a special act, enabling them to offer such
advantages by way of preference or priority to persons furnishing
new capital as would lead to its being obtained. And parliament,
in dealing with such applications, has been in the habit of considering how far the arrangements proposed as to such new capital were
assented to, or dissented from, by those who might be considered as
the proprietors of the existing capital of the company, either as
shareholders or bondholders. The object of the present act * * *
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appears to be to dispense with a special application to parliament
of the kind I have described, and to give a parliamentary sanction
to a scheme filed in the court of chancery, and confirmed by the
court, and assented to by certain majorities of shareholders and of
holders of debentures and securities ejusdemrgeneris." And even
now in England special acts are passed whenever the provisions of
the general act are not such as are needed to meet the wants of a
particular company. A special act of this kind was considered in
London FinancialAssociation v. Wrexham, Mold and Connah's
Quay Railway Co., L. R., 18 Eq. 566.
In Canada, no general statute like that in England has been enacted, but the old English practice of passing a special act in each
particular case prevails, and OSLER, J., said in Jones v. Canada
Central Railway Co., 46 U. C. Q. B. 261, "our statute books are
full" of legislation of the kind. The particular question in that
case was whether, after the establishment of the Dominion government, the provincial parliaments had authority to pass laws with
reference to provincial corporations which would operate upon debentures payable in England, and held by persons residing there,
but it was not suggested, either by the court or counsel, that a
statute of the kind, passed by the Dominion Parliament in reference to a Dominion corporation, would not be valid as a law. So far
as we are advised, the parliamentary authority for such legislation
has never been doubted either in England or Canada. Many cases
are reported in which such statutes were under consideration, but
in no one of them has it been intimated that the power was even
questionable.
In GiVllan v. Union Canal Company, at the present term, it
was said that holders of bonds and other obligations, issued by large
corporations for sale in the market, and secured by mortgages to
trustees, or otherwise, have by fair implication, certain contract relations with each other. In England, we infer from what was said
by Lord CAIRNs, Cambrian Railways Company's Sheme, 8upra,
they are considered as in a sense part proprietors of the existing
capital of the company, and dealt with by parliament and the
courts accordingly. They are not there, any more than here, corporators, and thus necessarily, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, bound by the will of the majority as to matters within the
scope of the corporate powers, but they are interested in the administration of a trust which has been created for their common
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benefit. Ordinarily their ultimate security depends in a large degree
on the success of the work in which the corporation is engaged, and it
is not uncommon foi differences of opinion to exist as to what ought to
be done for the promotion of their mutual interests. In the absence
of statutory authority, or some provision in the instrument which.establishes the trust, nothing can be done by a majority, however large,
which will bind a minority without their consent. Hence it seems
to be eminently proper that where the legislative power exists some
statutory provision should be made for binding the minority in a
reasonable way by the will of the majority; and unless, as is the
case in the states of the United States, the passage of laws impairing
the obligation of contracts is forbidden, we see no good reason why
such provision may not be made in respect to existing as well as
prospective obligations. The nature of securities of this class is
such, that the right of legislative supervision for the good of S11,
unless restrained by some constitutional prohibition, seems almost
nebessarily to form one of their ingredients, and when insolvency is
threatened, and the interests of the public, as well as creditors are
imperilled by-the financial embarrassments of the corporation, a
reasonable "scheme of arrangement" may, in our opinion, as well
be legalized as an ordinary "composition in bankruptcy." In fact,
such "arrangement acts" are a species of bankrupt acts. Their
object is to enable corporations created for the good of the public,
to relieve themselves from financial embarrassments by appropriating
their property to the settlement and adjustment of their affairs, so
that they may accomplish the purposes for which they were incorporated. The necessity for such legislation is clearly shown in the
preamble to the Grand Trunk Arrangement Act, 1862, passed by
the Parliament of the Province of Canada, on the 9th of June 1862,
before the establishment of the Dominion government, and which is
in these words:
"Whereas, the interest on all the bonds of the Grand Trunk
Railway Company of Canada is in arrear, as well as the rent of the
railways leased to it, and the company has also become indebted,
both in Canada and in England, on simple contract, to various persons and corporations, and several of the creditors have obtained
judgment against it, and much litigation is now pending; and
whereas the keeping open of the railway traffic, which is of the
utmost importance to the interests of the province, is thereby imperilled, and the terms of a compromise have been provisionally
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settled between the different classes of creditors and the company,
but in order to facilitate and give effect to such compromise the interference of the legislature of the province is necessary."
The confirmation and legalization of "1a scheme of arrangement"
under such circumstances is no more than is done in bankruptcy,
when a "comp o sition" agreement with the bankrupt debtor, if
assented to by the required majority of creditors, is made binding
on the non-assenting minority. In no just sense do such governmental regulations deprive a person of his property without due
process of law. They simply require each individual to so conduct
himself for the general good as not unnecessarily to injure another.
Bankrupt laws have been in -force in England for more than three
centuries, and they had their origin in the Roman law. The constitution expressly empowers the Congress of the United States to
esiablish such laws. Every member of a political community must
necessarily part with some of the rights which, as an individual,
not affected by his relation to others, he might have retained. Such
concessions make up the consideration he gives for the obligation
of the body politic to protect him in life, liberty and property.
Bankrupt laws, whatever may be the form they assume, are of that
character.
2. That the laws of a country have no extfa-territorial force is
an axiom of international jurisprudence, but things done in one
country under the authority of law may be of binding effect in
another country. The obligor of the bonds and coupons here sued
on was a corporation created for a public purpose, that is to say, to
build, maintain and work a railway in Canada. It had its corporate
home in Canada, and Was subject to the exclusive legislative authority of the Dominion parliament. It had no power to borrow money
or incur debts except for completing, maintaining and working its
railway. The bonds taken by the defendants in error showed on
their face that they were part of a series amounting in the aggre.
gate to a very large sum of money, and that they were secured by
a trust mortgage on the railway of the company, its lands, tolls,
revenues, &c. In this way the defendants in error, when they
bought their bonds, were, in legal effect, informed that they were
entering into contract relations not only with a foreign corporation
created for a public purpose, and carrying on its business within a
foreign jurisdiction, but with the holders of other bonds of the
same series, who were relying equally with themselves for their

CANADA SOUTHERN RAILROAD CO. v. GEBHARD.

ultimate security on a mortgage of property devoted to a public use,
situated entirely within the territory of a foreign government.
A corporation "must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty" (Bank of Augusta v. -Earle,
13 Pet. 588), though it may de business in all places where its
charter allows and the local laws do not forbid: Railroadv. Koontz,
104 U. S. 12. But wherever it goes for business it carries its
charter, as that is the law of its existence (Relf v. Ilundel, 103
U. S. 226); and the charter is the same abroad that it is at home.
Whatever disabilities are placed upon the corporation at home it
retains abroad, and whatever legislative control it is subjected to at
home must be recognised and submitted to by those who deal with it
elsewhere. A corporation of one country may be excluded from
business in another country (Paulv. Viryinia, 8 Wall. 168), but,
if admitted, it must, in the absence of legislation equivalent to making it a corporation of the latter country, be taken, both by the
government and those who deal with it, as a creature of the law
of its own country, and subject to all the legislative control and
direction that may be properly exercised over it at the place of its
creation. Such being the law, it follows that every person who
deals with a foreign corporation impliedly subjects himself to such
laws of the foreign government, affecting the powers and obligations of the corporation with which he voluntarily contracts, as the
known and established policy of that government authorizes. To
all intents and purposes, he submits his contract with the corporation to such a policy of the foreign government, and whatever is
done by that government in furtherance of that policy, which binds
those in like situation with himself, who are subjects of the government, in respect to the operation and effect of their contracts with
the corporation, will necessarily bind him. He is conclusively presumed to have contracted with a view to such laws of that government, because the corporation must of necessity be controlled by
them, and it has no power to contract with a view to any other laws
with which they are not in entire harmony. It follows, therefore,
that anything done at the legal home of the corporation, under the
authority of such laws, which discharges it from liability there, discharges it everywhere.
No better illustration of the propriety of this rule can be found
than in the facts of the present case. This corporation was created
in Canada to build and work a railway in that Dominion. Its principal business was to be done in Canada, and the bulk of its cor-
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porate property was permanently fixed there. All its powers to
contract were derived from the Canadian government, and all the
contracts it could make were such as related directly or indirectly
to its business in Canada. That business affected the public interests, and the keeping of the railWay open for traffic was of the
utmost importance to the people of the Dominion. The corporation had become financially embarrassed, and was and had been
for a long time unable to meet its engagements in the ordinary
way as they matured. There was an urgent necessity that something be done for the settlement of its affairs. In this the public,
the creditors and the shareholders were all interested. A large
majority of the creditors and shareholders had agreed on a plan of
adjustment which would enable the company to go on with its business, and thus accommodate the public, and to protect the creditors to the full extent of the available value of its corporate property. The Dominion parliament had the legislative power to
legalize the plan of adjustment as it had been agreed on by the
majority of those interested, and to bind the resident minority
creditors by its terms. This power was known and recognised
throughout the Dominion when the corporation was created, and
when all its bonds were executed and put on the market and sold.
It is in accordance with and part of the policy of the English
and Canadian governments in dealing with embarrassed and insolvent railway companies and in providing for their reorganization
in the interest of all concerned. It takes the place in England and
Canada of foreclosure sales in the United States, which in general
accomplish substantially the same result with more expense and
greater delay, for it rarely happens in the United States that foreclosures of railway mortgages are anything else than the machinery
by which arrangements between the creditors and other parties in
interest are carried into effect and a reorganization of the affairs of
the corporation under a new name brought about. It is in entire
harmony with the spirit of bankrupt laws, the binding force of
which, upon those who are subject to the jurisdiction, is recognised
by all civilized nations. It is not in conflict with the Constitution
of the United States, which, although prohibiting states from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, allows Congress
"to establish * * * uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy
throughout the United States." Unless all parties in interest,
wherever they reside, can be bound by the arrangement which it is
sought to have legalized the scheme may fail. All home creditors

